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INTRODUCTION
In his first book, Ronald Dworkin famously called for “taking rights
seriously” by treating them as “trumps” over considerations of utility or the
general welfare.1 Taking Rights Seriously (along with other works) provoked
calls for taking responsibilities as well as (or instead of) rights seriously, or for
engaging in “responsibility talk,” not just “rights talk.”2 In Life’s Dominion,
Dworkin himself got on the responsibility bandwagon in justifying the right to
procreative autonomy and the right to die.3 He countenanced that government
may encourage women to take the decision whether to have an abortion
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Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law,
Boston University School of Law. I prepared this Essay for the Boston University School of
Law Symposium, Justice for Hedgehogs: A Conference on Ronald Dworkin’s Forthcoming
Book, September 25-26, 2009. I would like to thank Sotirios Barber, Corey Brettschneider,
Linda McClain, and Benjamin Zipursky for valuable conversations and comments
concerning this paper, and Eric Lee and Jameson Rice for helpful research assistance.
Professor Zipursky and I published a related paper. Benjamin C. Zipursky & James E.
Fleming, Rights, Responsibilities, and Reflections on the Sanctity of Life, in RONALD
DWORKIN 109 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007).
1 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at xv, 269 (1977).
2 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 76-108 (1991); Robin West, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term – Foreword:
Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 46 (1990).
3 RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA,
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 18-19, 213 (1993) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION].
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responsibly, so long as it does not compel conformity with its view of the
responsible decision.4
In Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin reiterates the call for taking rights
seriously and for conceiving rights as “trumps.”5 And he continues to engage
in responsibility talk, for he argues that government must respect individuals’
personal responsibility for their own lives.6 Yet he is largely silent concerning
the form of responsibility talk evident in Life’s Dominion, namely, allowing
government latitude for moralizing: encouraging people to exercise their rights
responsibly, short of compelling them to do what the government thinks is the
responsible thing to do. In this Essay, I will explore the extent to which, and
the ways in which, we should take responsibilities as well as rights seriously.7
I do not suggest that Dworkin has abandoned such responsibility talk in
Justice for Hedgehogs. I will, however, make the friendly suggestion that he
make it clearer and more prominent in the pages of Justice for Hedgehogs that
he still stands by the arguments he set forth in Life’s Dominion. Put another
way, I would observe that in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin writes, “I ask
readers to treat [his two books, Sovereign Virtue8 and Is Democracy Possible
Here?9] as incorporated into this one by reference.”10 I urge him likewise to
incorporate the arguments of Life’s Dominion into Justice for Hedgehogs.
I.
A.

A CRITIQUE OF DWORKIN’S MORALIZED LIBERALISM

Dworkin’s Place in the Project of “Moralizing” Liberalism

In Life’s Dominion, Dworkin propounds a notably “moralized” liberalism,
making moral arguments for the right to procreative autonomy and the right to
die while defending the authority of government to moralize concerning
persons’ exercise of these rights. In a passage that encapsulates this moralized
liberalism, he writes that America’s political heritage is characterized by “two

4

See id. at 151.
RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (forthcoming 2010) (Apr. 17, 2009
manuscript at 209, on file with the Boston University Law Review).
6 Id. In his article for this symposium, John Goldberg analyzes Dworkin’s arguments
concerning personal responsibility. See John C.P. Goldberg, Liberal Responsibility: A
Comment on Justice for Hedgehogs, 90 B.U. L. REV. 677, 677 (2010) (“I . . . assess one of
[Dworkin’s] central claims: namely, that a case for liberalism can be built around the idea
that each person bears a responsbility to live her life well.”).
7 This Essay is part of a larger book project I am working on with Linda C. McClain.
JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUE
(forthcoming 2011).
8 RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY
(2000) [hereinafter DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE].
9 RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL
DEBATE (2006).
10 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 5 (manuscript at 208).
5
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sometimes competing traditions”: “The first is the tradition of personal
freedom. The second assigns government responsibility for guarding the
public moral space in which all citizens live.”11 Dworkin continues: “A good
part of constitutional law consists in reconciling these two ideas.”12 And he
asks: “What is the appropriate balance in the case of abortion?”13
This passage may have surprised many readers, both critics and allies, for
two basic reasons. First, critics who associate liberals like Dworkin with
exaltation of the tradition of personal freedom may be heartened that he
acknowledges the legitimacy of the tradition that assigns government
responsibility for guarding the public moral space. And allies who celebrate
personal freedom may be alarmed that Dworkin sanctions governmental
protection of the moral environment. For example, T.M. Scanlon, a friendly
liberal ally, conceded that liberals including Dworkin have not talked very
much about the latter tradition or about government promoting respect for
intrinsic values like the sanctity of life.14
Second, critics and allies commonly associate Dworkin with the notion of
“rights as trumps” and thus with the idea that “taking rights seriously”
practically precludes reconciling rights with, or balancing rights against,
governmental concern for the moral environment.15 Indeed, some readers
might have expected a book by Dworkin on the right of procreative autonomy
and the right to die to defend these rights solely on the basis of an argument
about personal freedom. And they might have expected Dworkin to argue that
these rights trump the very concerns regarding the moral environment that he
here acknowledges as part of our political heritage and constitutional law.
Such critics and allies certainly would not have expected to hear Dworkin
talking about “reconciling” personal freedom with governmental protection of
the moral environment, nor would they have expected to see him asking where
the appropriate “balance” lies between these two concerns.
Dworkin’s recognition of the place of this second tradition in the American
political heritage is significant. Both as a matter of fit with our constitutional
precedents and practice and as a matter of a plausible conception of
government’s proper authority, Dworkin is right to recognize that there are
legitimate channels through which government may seek to promote the moral
environment, such as through civics education, the inculcation of moral and
political values, and the like. At the same time, however, there is no denying

11

DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION, supra note 3, at 150.
Id.
13 Id.
14 See T.M. Scanlon, Partisan for Life, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 15, 1993, at 45, 46
(reviewing DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION, supra note 3).
15 See, e.g., West, supra note 2, at 46-47 (criticizing Dworkin’s “liberal legalist” strategy
of “taking rights seriously” and proposing instead a “responsibility-based liberalism” that
would “take seriously not only the individual’s demand for rights but also the burdens of his
responsibility”).
12
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that this tradition has been invoked to justify appalling deprivations of freedom
and equality, for example censorship of great works of literature and
prohibition of interracial marriage.16 For this reason, it is understandable that
many liberals have sought to deny, avoid, or eradicate this tradition. Yet
Dworkin is right to see that the risks of this tradition do not justify rejecting it
entirely. Instead, he attempts to work with, and to work within, this tradition
and to make it safe for liberals and for fundamental principles of freedom and
equality.
That is not to say that liberals should now go all the way to become
perfectionists who propose to wield state power to sculpt perfect liberal
citizens with morally excellent liberal virtues. It is to say, short of that, that
liberals need to thicken up their moral arguments and provide a space within
which there can be discussion of inculcating liberal virtues and undertaking a
formative project of cultivating in citizens capacities and attitudes appropriate
for a liberal political and constitutional order.17 Dworkin’s Life’s Dominion,
and in particular its analysis of governmental protection of the moral
environment, fits within this larger liberal project of “moralizing” liberalism.
In this paper, I do not take a position concerning whether Dworkin goes far
enough (or too far) in this larger project.
Yet Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs seems to leave this project to one side
and therefore does not carry it forward (which is not to say that the new book
rejects this project or takes back anything said in Life’s Dominion). In one
passage concerning restricting liberty, Dworkin asks: “Why should [the
majority] not be permitted to protect the religious and sexual culture it favors .
. . ?”18 He answers:
The argument of this book is necessary to provide a decent answer. It
requires us to explain the distinctions and interconnections among
responsibility, authenticity, influence and subordination. The second
principle of dignity, whose right to ethical independence we assume,
means that just as we should live our lives in circumstances that flow
16 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (describing one of the appellate
court’s rationales for upholding Virginia’s miscegenation statute as “preserving the racial
integrity of its citizens” (citation omitted)).
17 See, e.g., STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 5-6 (2000); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES:
CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 5 (1990); LINDA C.
MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 4
(2006); Linda C. McClain, The Domain of Civic Virtue in a Good Society: Families,
Schools, and Sex Equality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1617, 1627 (2001); Linda C. McClain,
Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond ‘Empty’
Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 19, 19 (1998) [hereinafter McClain,
Toleration as Respect]; Linda C. McClain, Toward a Formative Project of Securing
Freedom and Equality, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1221, 1225 (2000); see also Abner S. Greene,
Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
18 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 5 (manuscript at 233).
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from a fair distribution of economic resource[s], so we must face those
lives in the cultural environment with the cultural resources that flow
from the individual decisions of unsubordinated people.19
There clearly will be limits on government’s protection of the moral and
cultural environment.
Dworkin’s arguments for rights in both Life’s Dominion and Justice for
Hedgehogs are grounded, not in neutrality or in autonomy, but in a deontology
of state conduct (if Dworkin will forgive the expression). In other words,
Dworkin advances a theory that derives from a conception of the permissible
bases for governmental decisions.20 His concern is with respecting limits on
the grounds for governmental decision and with avoiding governmental
coercion concerning questions such as how best to respect the sanctity of life.21
More generally, Dworkin’s theory is one that limits the grounds upon which a
state may restrict or regulate our basic liberties. Dworkin has specifically
denied that he is articulating a theory of rights that asks what our fundamental
or especially important interests are and what freedoms are necessary to secure
or further those interests.22 For example, despite Dworkin’s justification for a
right of procreative autonomy, his theory differs in important respects from a
theory of autonomy rooted in a conception of the person and what is necessary
for the development and exercise of moral powers, or the like. In this respect,
his theory differs from the Rawlsian theory of deliberative autonomy that I
have propounded in Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of
Autonomy.23
This feature of Dworkin’s theory in part accounts for why he contemplates a
relatively large space (compared to most liberals) for governmental moralizing.
In his view, there is a large space between complete, hands-off noninterference
with liberty, individuality, autonomy, or choice (of the sort strong autonomy or
individuality theorists advocate) and coercion. Furthermore, government need
not, and should not, be neutral in that large space. It may moralize, encourage
responsibility, and the like, so long as it does not coerce the ultimate
decision.24

19

Id.
DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION, supra note 3, at 151.
21 Id.
22 RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 65-66 (1985); DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, at 272-73.
23 JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY
61-85 (2006); see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 15-20, 29-35, 299-304 (1993).
24 See McClain, Toleration as Respect, supra note 17, at 91-100.
20
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The Responsibility Critique: Taking Responsibilities as Well as Rights
Seriously
1.

The Critique and Dworkin’s Response

Next, I shall take up the responsibility critique of liberal political and
constitutional theories like that of Dworkin. As I stated at the outset, Dworkin
is famous for propounding the notion of “taking rights seriously” and of “rights
as trumps,”25 beginning in Taking Rights Seriously and continuing through
Justice for Hedgehogs. On this view, constitutional rights, though not
absolute, generally prevail over the majority’s conception of the common good
or the general welfare.
In response, a number of calls for taking
responsibilities as well as (or instead of) rights seriously have emerged in
recent years. Indeed, both conservative legal scholars like Mary Ann Glendon
and progressive legal scholars like Robin West who have called for “taking
responsibilities seriously” have used Dworkin as a liberal whipping boy in
arguing that taking rights seriously has denigrated or even excluded concern
for responsibilities. Dworkin’s call for taking rights seriously is Exhibit A in
Glendon’s indictment of the American legal culture for becoming a regime in
which “rights talk” has driven out “responsibility talk” and has impoverished
our political and legal discourse.26 It also plays a large role in West’s
argument that liberals and progressives must learn to “take freedom seriously”
by taking responsibilities as well as rights seriously.27
Here I shall focus on two charges that Glendon and West make against
Dworkin. First, they charge that his notion of taking rights seriously excludes
taking responsibilities seriously and, in particular, precludes governmental
promotion of the moral environment. Second, they charge that on his
conception of rights as trumps, rights to privacy or autonomy require that the
right-holder be insulated from moral scrutiny, persuasion, or exhortation by the
government.
Against this backdrop, it is striking that in Life’s Dominion Dworkin
answers the calls to take responsibilities as well as rights seriously, that is, to
some extent he engages in responsibility talk in justifying the right to
procreative autonomy and the right to die. Reading Glendon and West, one
would imagine that Dworkin would develop a liberal autonomy argument that
simply, abstractly, and absolutely entails that there is a right to abortion and
euthanasia with which government may not interfere. On their accounts of
Dworkin, one would expect him to argue that the rights to abortion and
euthanasia are rights to be “insulated” from governmental attempts to persuade
people to exercise their rights responsibly and to encourage them to reflect
conscientiously about respect for the intrinsic value of the sanctity of life.28
25
26
27
28

DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, at xv, 269.
GLENDON, supra note 2, at 40.
West, supra note 2, at 46.
Id. at 81-82.
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One would expect Dworkin to advance a strong autonomy argument, even a
right of the “lone rights bearer” to be let alone.29
Dworkin’s argument defies such expectations in a way that might worry
full-throated liberal autonomy theorists, not to mention liberal neutrality
theorists. I have already shown that the first charge – that Dworkin’s theory
precludes governmental protection of the moral environment – is mistaken.
Next, I will show that the second charge – that Dworkin’s arguments for the
rights of procreative autonomy and the right to die entail a right to be insulated
from governmental persuasion or exhortation – is also erroneous. Dworkin
argues that the rights to abortion and euthanasia do not preclude government
from pursuing the goal of responsibility: encouraging people to exercise these
rights responsibly by “treat[ing] decisions about abortion [and euthanasia] as
matters of moral importance.”30 That is, while state governments “have no
power to impose on their citizens a particular view of how and why life is
sacred,” they “do have the power to encourage their citizens to treat the
question of abortion [and euthanasia] seriously.”31
But Dworkin is at pains to insist upon the distinction between, on the one
hand, government encouraging responsibility and on the other, government
coercing conformity with the majority’s conception of the responsible decision:
in short, the distinction between responsibility and coercion.32 And he is
equally at pains to maintain that, even if the rights to abortion and euthanasia
are not rights of persons “to be insulated from all others” in making their
decisions, it is their right to make the “ultimate decision.”33 Here, it is notable
that Dworkin hews closely to the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, which I will discuss later in this paper.34
29

GLENDON, supra note 2, at 47-66.
DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION, supra note 3, at 150.
31 Id. at 153.
32 Id. at 150-59.
33 Id. at 153 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)
(joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.)).
34 In Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin still contemplates that even if a person has a right
to do something, for example, have an abortion, that does not necessarily mean that the
person is to be insulated from what I am calling governmental moralizing short of
government’s compelling the ultimate decision. He writes:
But even if we accept that negative answer to the moral question, and hold that a
mother has no moral duty not to abort the fetus she carries, critical ethical issues
remain. For it remains a vivid possibility that abortion is nevertheless inconsistent with
the respect for human life on which our dignity depends. . . . That is why it is crucial,
in discussing abortion and related issues, to take care to distinguish the moral from the
ethical issues in play.
DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 5 (manuscript at 236-37). He continues:
Liberty – the right of ethical independence – . . . is violated and liberty denied when
government restricts freedom in order to enforce a collective ethical judgment: a
collective ethical judgment, in this instance, that a woman who aborts an early
pregnancy does not show the respect for human life that her dignity demands. I myself
30
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Therefore, it is likely that even if Dworkin goes so far as to disconcert some
liberal autonomy or neutrality theorists – the folks who would deeply resent
any governmental moralizing about responsible exercise of rights – he does not
go far enough to satisfy conservative proponents of taking responsibilities
seriously, such as Glendon. In the areas of abortion and euthanasia,
conservatives want more than encouraging deliberation and responsible
decision making; they want to be sure that people make the decision they (or,
they might say, the majority) think is the responsible decision. Truth be told,
conservative proponents of responsibility like Glendon by and large support
coercing conformity with what they believe is the responsible decision (at least
with respect to abortion and euthanasia). That is, in Dworkin’s terms, Glendon
advocates responsibility as conformity or coercion.
Glendon might counter by charging that Dworkin, in talking about
responsibility, has done little more than co-opt the language of responsibility in
service of a liberal theory of autonomy. She certainly would argue that his talk
in Justice for Hedgehogs of individual responsibility for one’s own life is
nothing more than the right to personal autonomy. Put another way, she might
argue that encouraging responsibility as Dworkin conceives it is a sham, just
another word for encouraging autonomy – which itself was misguided and
deeply mistaken to begin with, and which is no more justified when dressed up
in the garb of responsibility. There is indeed a nice irony here: Dworkin, in
distinguishing between responsibility and coercion, is saying that government
is not promoting responsibility unless it respects the right of the individual
ultimately to decide for herself or himself. This is what Linda McClain has
called a conception of responsibility as autonomy.35 And it is a right and a
conception that Glendon would see as licensing irresponsibility, in contrast
with Glendon’s view, which McClain has called a notion of responsibility as
accountability.36
By contrast, progressive proponents of responsibility like West have been
heartened by Dworkin’s proposal to take responsibilities seriously in the

believe that to be the correct ethical judgment in many cases. A woman acts
inconsistently with her own dignity when she aborts for frivolous reasons: to avoid
rescheduling a holiday, for instance. A different ethical judgment is in my view
appropriate in other cases: when a teen-aged woman’s prospects for a decent life would
be ruined by becoming a single mother, for example. But whether the judgment is
right or wrong in any particular case, it remains an ethical not a moral judgment. That
judgment must be made, in a society that respects individual dignity, by people who
take responsibility for their own ethical convictions.
Id. (manuscript at 237) (footnote omitted).
35 Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 DUKE L.J. 989, 1077-87 (1994).
36 Id. at 1077-82.
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exercise of rights cherished by liberals.37 The same can be said for some
proponents of a moralized liberalism.38
Now, before I ask whether Dworkin’s program for taking responsibilities as
well as rights seriously is sound, I should ask whether it is consistent with the
rest of his work. For example, is the latitude Dworkin allows government to
moralize and encourage responsibility consistent with statements in his other
works that government cannot improve persons’ lives against the grain of their
convictions that it is not doing so? Is it consistent with Dworkin’s repeated
statements in Justice for Hedgehogs that government must respect individuals’
responsibility for their own lives, even though protecting one person’s ethical
independence may impose costs on others?39
I believe it is, because while Dworkin leaves room for governmental
moralizing, he protects persons’ rights to make the ultimate decision. Again,
Dworkin distinguishes between encouraging responsibility and coercing
conformity. This puts in relief an important feature of Dworkin’s political
philosophy and constitutional theory that has been present in his work from the
beginning but which perhaps has been underappreciated: namely that his
theory of taking rights seriously rests upon a theory about the permissible
grounds for governmental decisions, not upon a fundamental interest theory of
rights (for example, what rights are necessary to enable persons to develop and
exercise their autonomy). Therefore, when Dworkin castigates the government
for being tyrannical or oppressive, he is objecting to the government ramming
down people’s throats conceptions of the good or of the intrinsic value of the
sanctity of life – or to the government coercing people’s beliefs or actions
regarding such conceptions. He is not objecting to governmental moralizing
short of coercion on these grounds.
2.

The Difficulties with Dworkin’s Responsibility Arguments

Dworkin’s argument for the right to procreative autonomy and the right to
die – which takes responsibilities as well as rights seriously – satisfactorily
responds to Glendon’s responsibility critique. Yet it leads to difficulties of
line-drawing in the interpretation and enforcement of these rights, in particular,
the right to abortion. First, it may be difficult to maintain the distinction
between encouraging responsibility and coercing conformity, especially in the
hands of predominantly conservative courts. For example, Dworkin applauds
the Casey joint opinion for recognizing and insisting upon this distinction.40
37 See, e.g., Robin West, Integrity and Universality: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s
Freedom’s Law, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1313, 1313 (1997).
38 See, e.g., McClain, Toleration as Respect, supra note 17, at 91-100.
39 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 5 (manuscript at 232) (“Government
must not abridge total freedom when its putative justification relies on some collective
decision about what makes a life good or well-lived. We must each make that decision for
himself: that is the core of our ethical responsibility.”).
40 DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION, supra note 3, at 153.
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Yet the joint opinion upheld the twenty-four hour waiting period as not
constituting an undue burden on the right to abortion.41 Dworkin criticizes the
joint opinion for doing so.42 He argues that such a waiting period does pose a
significant obstacle to a pregnant woman’s exercise of her right, and further,
that it is not likely to enhance responsible, reflective decision making.43 In
Casey, Justice Stevens uses stronger language (language that sounds like it
comes straight out of Dworkin): the waiting period insults a pregnant woman’s
equal respect and dignity by implying that she has not already reflected upon
the decision.44
Furthermore, Dworkin at one point evidently conceded that the state not
only may encourage responsibility about the decision, but also may express a
collective view about the responsible decision, namely, that a pregnant woman
should not have an abortion.45 Yet in Life’s Dominion, Dworkin evidently
stops short of making that concession (as he does also in Justice for
Hedgehogs46). In Casey, Justice Stevens, who advocates a conception of
autonomy that otherwise seems quite similar to Dworkin’s, concludes that the
state may not go that far: he argues that a state may not “inject into a woman’s
most personal deliberations its own views of what is best.”47 So there may be
difficulties, even among like-minded autonomy theorists, in drawing this line
in the interpretation and enforcement of rights.
The abortion funding cases illustrate further difficulties of line-drawing. If
Dworkin sides with the authors of the Casey joint opinion in concluding that
the state may moralize by encouraging responsibility, he emphatically does not
side with them with respect to Harris v. McRae, the grandfather (or
grandmother) of all of the cases holding that the government may encourage
women not to exercise their right to an abortion, but instead to carry their
fetuses to term because it deems doing so to be in the public interest.48 Harris
held that the government, by funding childbirth but not abortion for indigent
women, could encourage women to undergo childbirth rather than exercising

41

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885-87 (1992) (joint opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.).
42 DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION, supra note 3, at 153, 174.
43 Id. at 174.
44 Casey, 505 U.S. at 918-19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The
mandatory delay thus appears to rest on outmoded and unacceptable assumptions about the
decisionmaking capacity of women.”).
45 Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 409-10 (1992) [hereinafter Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights],
reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 72, 96-97 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW].
46 DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 5 (manuscript at 237).
47 Casey, 505 U.S. at 916. Justice Stevens quotes Dworkin’s work. Id. at 913 (citing
Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights, supra note 45, at 400-01).
48 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980).
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their right to have an abortion.49 The four dissenters in Harris argued that such
encouragement was tantamount to coercion.50 Dworkin agrees with the
dissenters and argues that it is time, after Casey, to reexamine Harris.51 But it
is absolutely clear that Dworkin would draw the line in Harris differently than
the Casey joint opinion. That is, just as the authors of the joint opinion did not
conclude that the twenty-four hour waiting period constituted an undue burden,
they would not conclude that funding childbirth but not abortion crosses the
line from encouragement to coercion.
More generally, we should not be surprised to find conservative Justices
concluding that governmental moralizing does not go too far, either because
they are dubious about arguments, like those by the dissenters in Harris, that
governmental encouragement amounts to coercion or because they ultimately
believe that government may encourage “responsibility” by coercing
conformity to the majority’s view of the responsible decision. Furthermore,
we should not be surprised if conservative Justices are dubious about the very
idea of responsibility as autonomy (as distinguished from responsibility as
accountability), just as they are dubious about rights of autonomy to begin
with.
Dworkin of all people should be wary of an “undue burden” standard for
determining whether the government has infringed basic liberties by posing
significant obstacles that amount to coercion. If anything should provoke him
to get up on his high horse about taking rights seriously, it should be an “undue
burden” test. Because it is analogous to a “balancing” test, an “undue burden”
test would seem to be anathema to Dworkin where constitutional rights are in
play. We might expect him to worry that an “undue burden” test will not
sufficiently protect rights, particularly autonomy rights. For majorities are
especially likely to undervalue politically controversial autonomy rights or to
view them as licentious, unruly, or indeed irresponsible.
Again, even if Dworkin understandably were carried along by the powerful
and attractive language of the Casey joint opinion, he should have been made
wary by the fact that the joint opinion, applying the “undue burden” standard,
did uphold the twenty-four hour waiting period and therefore did implicitly
reaffirm Harris. And so, when all is said and done, Dworkin does a masterful
job of attempting to “take responsibilities as well as rights seriously,” but once
he gets into the potential quagmire of the “undue burden” standard, he may
want to get out and call for “taking rights seriously.” I say this partly because
of his general jurisprudential wariness of balancing tests (the one thing
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Id. at 314.
Id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 347 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 348-49
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 354 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51 DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION, supra note 3, at 175-76.
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Dworkin has in common with Justice Scalia52) and partly because of the way
the cases will come out where conservative Justices apply the standard and
draw the lines. In short, for someone like Dworkin, there is nothing like an
“undue burden” standard to bring out a longing for rights as trumps.
Furthermore, Dworkin’s argument may open the door to governmental
moralizing and across-the-board encouragement of responsibility with respect
to rights; responsibility may prove to be an idea that is not easily cabined.53
We should step back and assess the breadth of Dworkin’s endorsement of
governmental efforts to encourage responsibility in the exercise of rights. And
we should ask what types of governmental efforts to encourage such
responsibility are consistent with Justice for Hedgehogs. To begin, I observe
that while Dworkin has undertaken responsibility talk with respect to abortion
and euthanasia, he emphatically has not done so with respect to freedom of
speech. Why not? Are there differences in principle between abortion and
euthanasia, on the one hand, and freedom of speech, on the other? Dworkin
may claim that he has made clear that he is limiting his analysis of
responsibility to abortion and euthanasia. But can he successfully limit the
domain of responsibility? Or does he open the door, for example, to a
conservative moralism or a liberal perfectionism that is deeply offensive to
liberalism and deeply at odds with protecting the basic liberties secured
through our constitutional law?
Let us consider a few illustrations. Recall Whitney v. California, where
Justice Sanford’s opinion for the Supreme Court states that freedom of speech
does not confer a right to speak “without responsibility,” for that would be an
“unbridled license” or an “abuse” of freedom.54 Recall also that after the
Oklahoma City bombing, President Clinton urged right-wing mongers of
hatred toward the federal government to exercise their rights to free expression
responsibly.55 There are affinities between these examples and calls by
progressives and some liberals to regulate pornography and hate speech or
more generally harmful expression or offensive expression. We can generalize
and see these calls as versions of calls to exercise rights to freedom of
expression responsibly, with concern for the common good and for the welfare
of others or with concern for securing the status of free and equal citizenship
for all.

52 For Justice Scalia’s critique of the “undue burden” standard and balancing, see, for
example, Casey, 505 U.S. at 987-93 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
53 Cf. ARCHIBALD COX, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF REFORM 6 (1968) (“Once loosed, the idea of Equality is not easily
cabined.”).
54 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927).
55 Todd S. Purdum, Terror in Oklahoma: The President; Shifting Debate to the Political
Climate, Clinton Condemns ‘Promoters of Paranoia,’ N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1995, at A19.
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Tellingly, many of the conservative proponents of taking responsibility
seriously in the areas of abortion and euthanasia do not call for responsibility
with respect to freedom of speech. Instead, they decry these calls for
responsibility as calls for “politically correct speech,” as thought control, group
rights, and the like. Similarly, liberals like Dworkin have rejected progressive
calls to protect certain groups from harmful or offensive expression.56 But
again, are there significant differences between abortion and euthanasia, on the
one hand, and freedom of expression, on the other? Or, once we get on the
responsibility bandwagon, are we obligated in principle to stay on board
through the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression?
Dworkin might argue that abortion and euthanasia are special because they
implicate the intrinsic value of the sanctity of life. He might contend that
although government generally may not moralize or encourage people to
exercise their rights responsibly, government may do so when the sanctity of
life is at stake. But what about political values, which, as Rawls once stated,
are very great values and hence not easily overridden?57 For example, may
government encourage people to vote, and to vote responsibly? Or may
government encourage people to engage in political expression, and to do so
responsibly? Or may government encourage people to respect one another as
free and equal citizens, and, pursuant to that very great political value, not
engage in hateful racist expression?58
Some liberals might well conclude that, instead of accepting Dworkin’s
arguments regarding taking responsibilities as well as rights seriously, they
would do better to advance a stronger notion of autonomy to rein in
governmental promotion of responsibility that is too intrusive. From this
standpoint, Justice Stevens in Casey articulates the stronger and therefore
superior autonomy justification for the right to abortion (not to mention his
argument for the right to die in his Cruzan dissent59).60 With such a view on
hand, we might be in a better position to resist the conservative tendency to
abandon responsibility as autonomy and to collapse responsibility into
coercion and conformity (perhaps rooted in the basic view that responsibility is
56 See DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 45, at 204-07 (criticizing statutes drafted
to outlaw certain types of offensive speech); id. at 214-26 (criticizing attempts to censor
certain types of pornographic and hate speech); id. at 227-43 (criticizing attempts to censor
pornography).
57 RAWLS, supra note 23, at 139.
58 See FLEMING, supra note 23, at 175-94 (discussing clashes between protecting freedom
of expression and securing equal citizenship); Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation:
The Visibility of Hate, Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law School (Oct. 5-7, 2009).
59 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 330-57 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 738-52 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgments).
60 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 916 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Decisional autonomy must limit the State’s
power to inject into a woman’s most personal deliberations its own views of what is best.”).
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conformity, not autonomy). And we certainly could avoid or simplify some of
the line-drawing difficulties just mentioned. Moreover, although Stevens’s
notion of autonomy may fit better with strains of earlier Supreme Court
decisions, I would acknowledge that Dworkin’s view better matches the Casey
joint opinion and may be superior as a matter of public philosophy.
We might also speculate that in Life’s Dominion, Dworkin departed from a
stronger notion of autonomy, like that of Stevens, because he aims better to fit
and justify the Casey joint opinion, or because he wants to do a better job of
developing “philosophy from the inside out.”61 Ironically, Stevens the Justice
writes with greater freedom than Dworkin the public philosopher: Stevens,
unlike Dworkin, feels no obligation to fit and justify the joint opinion, or the
commitments out there in the public discourse.
The difficulties mentioned above may be due in part to the form of
Dworkin’s argument: public philosophy. First, and most obviously, Dworkin
aims at accommodation and settlement, so he makes concessions to the
responsibility critique – and to the Casey joint opinion – that introduce the
difficulties sketched in this section, including line-drawing and opening the
door to responsibility talk regarding rights across the board. Second, Dworkin
couples abortion and euthanasia in part because they are coupled in public
discourse, and in part because both are seen in public discourse as essentially
religious issues. As Benjamin Zipursky and I have argued elsewhere, this may
lead Dworkin to offer a religious freedom justification for the right to
procreative autonomy and the right to die that leads to difficulties for those
rights, in particular, the right to die.62 But his coupling of abortion and
euthanasia may obscure arguments for the right to procreative autonomy that
do not carry over into arguments for the right to die, most importantly, feminist
equal protection arguments rooted in concerns to protect women from sexual
discrimination and subordination. Feminist equal protection arguments would
alert us to concerns about coercion of women’s decisions short of coercion of
their ultimate decisions. To be sure, Dworkin is quite ecumenical concerning
the kinds of arguments he countenances and the textual homes he contemplates
for them, for he sees overlap between the Equal Protection Clause, the Due
Process Clause, and the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses.63 But when
Dworkin speaks of equality arguments in this context, he apparently has in
mind arguments from equal concern and respect, and in particular, arguments
like his own, not feminist equal protection arguments.64 Nonetheless, the point
holds that feminist arguments would be more attuned to risks of subtle
coercion than would Dworkin’s analysis, not to mention being more attentive
61

DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION, supra note 3, at 28.
See Zipursky & Fleming, supra note *, at 130-32.
63 DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION, supra note 3, at 160-68.
64 Though, to be perfectly fair, his tack in responding to Catharine MacKinnon is to
defend privacy or autonomy arguments against her critique and then to say it is fine for her
to make her feminist equal protection arguments as well. Id. at 52-57.
62

2010]

RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS

853

to assumptions about the naturalness of motherhood and assumptions that
women may not have the capacity for wise and responsible exercise of their
rights.
II.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FORM OF DWORKIN’S ARGUMENTS: PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY OR THE SIMPLE TRUTH OF THE MATTER?

The form of Dworkin’s arguments in Life’s Dominion is striking and merits
comment. His arguments are not simply arguments from the political
philosophy seminar room. For example, they are not arguments from first
principles of liberal political philosophy, such as freedom, equality, autonomy,
individuality, or toleration. Instead, Dworkin claims to be engaging in
“philosophy from the inside out,” or to be writing “an argumentative essay that
engages theoretical issues but begins with, and remains disciplined by, a moral
subject of practical political importance.”65 He distinguishes “philosophy from
the inside out” from philosophy that connects theory and practice from the
“outside in.”66 Put another way, he distinguishes between theories “made for
the occasion,” like suits made by tailors on London’s Savile Row, and readymade theories, like suits found on New York’s Seventh Avenue.67 Dworkin
says that theories constructed from the inside out “may be more likely to
succeed in the political forum.”68 It warrants asking to what extent Justice for
Hedgehogs likewise represents “philosophy from the inside out” rather than
from the “outside in.”
These formulations are notable because Dworkin has been criticized for
having grand abstract theories that he brought down from on high (or from the
“outside in”) readily to resolve every evidently difficult moral, philosophical,
or constitutional issue. Life’s Dominion is certainly the most grounded of any
of Dworkin’s works to date; grounded not only in constitutional cases but also
in real world developments, public opinion polls, and the like. T.M. Scanlon
has characterized the form of political philosophy Dworkin practices and
commends in Life’s Dominion as “public philosophy.”69 I daresay, with
Scanlon, that the publication of Life’s Dominion confirmed Dworkin’s status as
“our leading public philosopher.”70
I shall note some of the ways in which Dworkin’s arguments of philosophy
from the “inside out” differ from – and are more constrained than – arguments
from the political philosophy seminar room. First, and most obviously,
Dworkin’s arguments in Life’s Dominion are arguments not only of political
philosophy but also of constitutional theory and constitutional law. Hence, his
65

Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 29.
67 Id.
68 Id. He even goes so far as to say that such arguments “may be better suited to the
academy too.” Id. But he steps back, recognizing “that is another story.” Id.
69 Scanlon, supra note 14, at 45.
70 Id.
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arguments are constrained by the aspiration to fit and justify constitutional text,
history, and structure, to say nothing of tradition, practice, and culture. In
particular, Dworkin aims to fit and justify leading cases involving the right to
procreative autonomy, such as Griswold v. Connecticut,71 Roe v. Wade,72 and
Casey. That is, he seeks a reflective equilibrium between his theory and the
legal materials. To be plausible as a theory of our constitutional order, as
distinguished from an ideal liberal order, Dworkin must fit and justify most of
the significant legal materials; but he may criticize some of those materials as
wrongly decided. For example, he criticizes two leading cases involving the
right to die, Cruzan and Glucksberg.73
Second, Dworkin’s arguments are constrained by his aspiration to be a
public philosopher and to resolve a divisive issue in the political forum. He
constructs his arguments in response to contemporary moral, political, and
constitutional controversies. And he aims to change the character of public
debate on abortion and euthanasia. Consequently, his arguments are
constrained by his quest to fit and justify certain considered judgments or
moral convictions extant in the polity, as revealed in public opinion polls,
public statements by political figures, and the like. He claims to have his
finger on the pulse of public moral conviction, or to capture the nerve of such
conviction. His goal is nothing less than to grasp and re-characterize certain
arguments and issues in order to make accommodation and settlement more
likely. This project leads him to concede more than we might expect, and
more than he might need, to the “pro-life” position. For example, Dworkin
suggests that if a fetus is a person then states may prohibit abortion as
murder,74 notwithstanding the existence of powerful and ingenious arguments
that even if a fetus is a person, women may have a right to abortion.75 It also
leads him to put forward justifications for the right to abortion and the right to
die that may imperil those rights, or at least present difficulties for them.76
Finally, the form of political philosophy in which Dworkin is engaged has
implications for his aims and the criteria for assessing his arguments. First,
what are his aims? He is not seeking to advance an argument that would put
the clamps of reason upon everyone everywhere and silence the disagreement
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381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a state law forbidding the use of
contraceptives by married couples).
72 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a Texas statute forbidding anyone
from procuring an abortion).
73 Dworkin’s criticism of Glucksberg was published subsequent to Life’s Dominion. See
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 8, at 465-73.
74 DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION, supra note 3, at 9-10.
75 See, e.g., F.M. KAMM, CREATION AND ABORTION: A STUDY IN MORAL AND LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 78-123 (1992); EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK:
FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT 10 (1996); Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, PHIL.
& PUB. AFF., Autumn 1971, at 47, 47.
76 See Zipursky & Fleming, supra note *, at 130-33.
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of all reasonable people. Nor on the other hand is he seeking common ground
in the sense of a half-way compromise of opposing positions or simply
learning to live together disagreeing about abortion.77 Some readers, including
sympathetic readers like Laurence Tribe, have criticized Dworkin for thinking
that he could resolve the problems surrounding abortion and euthanasia simply
by redescribing the arguments of supporters and opponents of these rights.78
But this criticism rests upon a misunderstanding; again, Dworkin is trying to
re-characterize the arguments in order to pursue a settlement and
accommodation. He aims for more than pale civility, and more than “empty”
toleration; indeed, he apparently aims for respect.79
Next, what should be the criteria for assessing his arguments? Not formal
philosophical criteria alone, though of course these can be brought to bear in
analyzing the cogency and coherence of his arguments. And to be successful,
he does not have to persuade everyone. Rather, all he must do to have some
impact in the political forum is to persuade some people at the margins.
Furthermore, he might make an important contribution by offering an
argument that better articulates or bolsters convictions many people already
have in support of the right to have an abortion and the right to die, which were
at risk of being put in doubt by arguments against these rights. Finally, he
might achieve a measure of success – even if he did not persuade anyone to
change his or her fundamental views – by defending these rights in a manner
that would bring about greater understanding and respect by each side for the
other side’s positions.80
Justice for Hedgehogs, by contrast, seems less a work of public philosophy
so understood than a form of philosophy that simply and vigorously argues for
the truth of the matter – and for the unity of value across ethics, morality,
justice, and law – irrespective of what anyone else who vigorously disagrees
might think! Justice for Hedgehogs nonetheless is compatible with Life’s
Dominion. I simply urge Dworkin to bring this out more clearly.
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